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The Son had an automobile in-
surance policy with Hanover In-
surance Company ("Hanover") at
the time of the accident. As man-
dated by Massachusetts law, the
policy provided both uninsured
and underinsured coverage for pol-
icy owners and relatives living in
their households. Mass. Gen. L. ch.
175, sect. 1 13L (1988). After Han-
over denied a settlement to Mrs.
Vaiarella under the underinsured
provision of her Son's policy, she
filed suit in Massachusetts Superi-
or Court. She alleged that Hanover
had violated a Massachusetts stat-
ute, Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A, sec-
tions 2(a) and 9 (1988), by refusing
to make an offer of settlement.
The superior court found no
violation of the statute because, for
the purposes of underinsured mo-
torist coverage, Mrs. Vaiarella was
not a member of her Son's house-
hold at the time of the accident.
The court held for Hanover, and
Mrs. Vaiarella appealed to the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court.
Flexible Definition of Household
Member Does Not Include Future
Intentions
On appeal, Mrs. Vaiarella ar-
gued that the superior court erro-
neously determined she was not a
member of her Son's household for
insurance purposes. She further
alleged that Hanover had violated
Massachusetts state law by not
making a reasonable, good faith
investigation of her status. Mrs.
Vaiarella's primary support for
both arguments was that the supe-
rior court, in making the determi-
nation as to her status, failed to
consider her intention to live in her
Son's household for about six
months out of each year.
The supreme judicial court first
considered Mrs. Vaiarella's claim
of membership in her Son's house-
hold. It noted that because a vari-
ety of living arrangements exist in
today's society, an inflexible and
precise meaning should not be ap-
plied to the term "household mem-
ber." However, the court indicated
that since the household member
requirement for underinsured mo-
torist coverage was coatrolled by
statute, ambiguities in the policy
should not be construed against the
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insurance company. The definition
of household member, the court
reasoned, was a question of law
that required the examination of
specific facts on a case by case
basis.
The supreme judicial court rea-
soned that Mrs. Vaiarella's claim
was based almost entirely on future
intentions and not on an estab-
lished living arrangement. Before
August, 1984, the Vaiarellas had
lived independently from both
their children for forty years. Al-
though the Vaiarellas planned to
reside with their Son, they had
lived with him for only a few
months prior to the accident. Tak-
en together, the Vaiarellas' history
of living independently from their
children, their four-month stay in
the Son's home, and their long-
term intentions were not enough to
establish household membership.
The court added that Hanover
would not have known about the
Vaiarellas' intentions. Accurate
calculations of insurance risks re-
quire a knowledge of the volume of
persons covered; thus, the court
said, companies must be able to
identify all covered persons.
After discounting future inten-
tions, the court considered other
factors which indicated where the
Vaiarellas had established residen-
cy. The court did not rule out the
possibility of dual residences, but
considered such matters as where
the Vaiarellas received their mail,
where they transacted business,
where they maintained posses-
sions, as well as whether the Vai-
arellas were financially dependant
upon their Son.
Although the Vaiarellas had
lived with their Son in Brockton,
they, nonetheless, transferred their
mail to their daughter. Their
daughter handled all their business
affairs. Once in Florida, they also
received mail there. At least some
of their possessions were in Flori-
da, and Mr. Vaiarella obtained an
auto registration and driver's li-
cense in that state. (Since a Florida
driver's license and registration
were required to purchase the mo-
bile home, the court noted that
these factors did not significantly
weaken Mrs. Vaiarella's claim of
residence in Massachusetts.)
Even though some of the Vai-
arellas' possessions were with their
Son, none of their activities or
transactions significantly indicat-
ed residence with him or financial
dependence upon him. Moreover,
after the car accident, Mrs. Vai-
arella went to recuperate in her
daughter's home and then returned
to Florida, never again living with
her Son. Thus, the court concluded
that Mrs. Vaiarella had failed to
establish dual residences in Winter
Haven, Florida and Brockton,
Massachusetts.
Finally, the supreme judicial
court found no reason to comment
separately on whether Hanover
had made a reasonable, good faith
investigation to determine Mrs.
Vaiarella's residency.
Clarinda Gipson
Traditional Tort
Principles Dictate That
Corporate Successors
Are Not Liable To
Consumers
In Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594
A.2d 564 (Md. 1991), the Mary-
land Court of Appeals refused to
extend tort liability to a successor
corporation with no causal connec-
tion to the product causing a con-
sumer's injury. The court rein-
forced the traditional principle
that fault must exist before tort
liability can be imposed.
Background
Frederick Brandt ("Brandt")
purchased a treadmill from Atlan-
tic Fitness Products ("Atlantic") in
January, 1981. The treadmill was
designed, manufactured, and mar-
keted by American Tredex Corpo-
ration ("American Tredex").
In July, 1981, Nissen Corpora-
tion ("Nissen") purchased all as-
sets of American Tredex. The asset
purchase agreement specified that
Nissen would assume certain
American Tredex obligations and
liabilities. However, the agreement
explicitly stated that Nissen would
not shoulder any liability ensuing
from injuries associated with any
product previously sold by Ameri-
(continued on page 36)
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can Tredex. Furthermore, Ameri-
can Tredex would continue as a
corporation for five years under a
new name, AT Corporation.
Although the agreement did not
require it, Nissen retained some
American Tredex employees. Nis-
sen also continued to sell replace-
ment parts for equipment previ-
ously sold by American Tredex.
After the sale, however, Nissen
relocated the business from Indi-
ana to Iowa. Dealers were notified
of the asset purchase, and Nissen
established a new customer service
phone number.
In October, 1986, more than
five years after his purchase,
Brandt injured himself while ad-
justing his treadmill. In Septem-
ber, 1988, Brandt sued Nissen,
Atlantic, American Tredex, and
AT Corporation, which had dis-
solved pursuant to its contract.
Brandt sought damages for negli-
gence, breach of warranty, strict
liability, and loss of consortium.
Atlantic cross claimed against Nis-
sen for indemnity and contribu-
tion.
The Maryland trial court grant-
ed Nissen's motion for summary
judgment. Brandt and Atlantic ap-
pealed. The Court of Special Ap-
peals reversed the trial court's deci-
sion. Maryland's highest court, the
Court of Appeals, then considered
whether Nissen could be held lia-
ble for Brandt's injuries as the
successor to American Tredex.
The Traditional Rule of Corporate
Successor Nonliability
Generally, a corporation that
purchases the assets of another
does not automatically embrace
the predecessor's liabilities. The
well-settled rule is one of successor
nonliability, subject to four tradi-
tional exceptions. A corporate suc-
cessor takes on its predecessor's
liabilities when: (1) it expressly or
impliedly agrees to assume the
liabilities; (2) the transaction is a
consolidation or merger; (3) the
transaction is fraudulent; or (4) the
relationship merely amounts to a
continuation of the predecessor
entity ("continuity of entity"). In
addition to the four traditional
exceptions, some courts have also
recognized a continuity of enter-
prise exception.
The continuity of entity excep-
tion evolved out of a need to
protect consumers and creditors
from transactions in which the
purchasing corporation retained
similar management and owner-
ship from the predecessor corpora-
tion. The goal was to prevent the
successor corporation from escap-
ing liability when it remained in
substantially the same form as its
predecessor. Thus, the traditional
continuation theory focused on
continuation of the individual en-
tity through its ownership and
management. On the other hand,
the continuity of enterprise excep-
tion contemplated continuation of
the general business operation
without a continuation of owner-
ship.
The Parties' Contentions
Neither Brandt nor Atlantic
contended that any of the tradi-
tional exceptions to the general
rule of nonliability applied. How-
ever, Brandt and Atlantic claimed
that public policy demanded the
adoption of the continuity of enter-
prise exception.
Both Brandt and Atlantic argued
that Nissen should not enjoy the
fruits of its continued American
Tredex enterprise while escaping
the associated liabilities. Atlantic
argued that because Nissen en-
joyed American Tredex's good will
and held itself out as the compa-
ny's successor, Nissen should bear
liability for Brandt's injuries
caused by American Tredex's
treadmill.
Nissen countered with three ar-
guments. First, Nissen maintained
that it was not a part of the manu-
facturing and selling chain. Rather,
Nissen simply purchased the assets
of American Tredex. Moreover,
Nissen asserted, the asset purchase
agreement specifically excluded li-
ability emanating from defective
products sold prior to the asset
purchase. Finally, Nissen insisted
that the continuity of enterprise
theory was unfairly overbroad.
Nissen contended that this liability
theory would not extend solely to
major corporations; small corpora-
tions that purchased and contin-
ued businesses but abandoned
their predecessor's injurious prod-
ucts would also incur liability un-
der this rationale.
Court Rejected Liability Without
Fault
The Court of Appeals reversed
the appellate court and ruled that
Nissen was not liable for Brandt's
injuries. The court refused to
adopt the continuity of enterprise
exception since it contradicted the
fundamental principle that tort lia-
bility requires the existence of
fault. Because the continuity of
enterprise theory found its basis in
a public policy that failed to con-
template fault, a majority of the
court rejected the exception and
upheld the original grant of sum-
mary judgment in this case.
The court maintained that the
basis for Maryland's strict liability
law, the Restatement (Second) of
Torts 402A, did not abandon the
basic tort concept of fault. Under
402A, a seller who sent a defective
and unreasonably dangerous prod-
uct into the market was at fault
when the product injured a con-
sumer. Nissen, however, was not a
seller and did not place the tread-
mill on the market.
Nonetheless, to some extent
Nissen did continue the American
Tredex operation. Nissen replaced
parts for American Tredex prod-
ucts, serviced its customers, and
retained some of its employees.
The court reasoned, however, that
these elements did not blossom
into successor liability. Instead,
the court recognized the societal
benefit gained from Nissen's vol-
untary continuation of employ-
ment and customer service. The
court also noted the societal value
of protecting consumers, but reit-
erated the fact that Nissen was not
responsible for Brandt's injuries.
Furthermore, the court found
that the continuity of enterprise
exception was inherently unjust
because it favored large corpora-
tions. The court noted that large
corporations could either effective-
ly spread tort liability costs to
consumers or afford no-fault in-
surance. The continuity of enter-
prise doctrine unfairly discrimi-
nated against small corporations
that could not afford such costs.
Scott R. Anderson
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Co-Op Agreements
(continued from page 27)
that way, so we are stuck," says
Arnold Bronflin, owner of a chain
of luggage and leather goods stores.
Even retailers who can afford to
advertise on their own are reluc-
tant to give up co-op dollars. Barry
Lefkowitz, a business representa-
tive for off-price retailers, such as
Burlington Coat Factory Ware-
house, Inc., explains that "[c]o-op
advertising is a critical element in
the pricing structure of a good. So
if you do not have that allowance,
the cost [of] advertising is going to
be added to the product." In this
way, a loss of co-op dollars trans-
lates into either a loss in profit
margin or a loss in sales to compe-
tition.
Antitrust attorneys and consum-
er advocates alike agree that co-op
advertising impacts consumers
more than anyone else. Kristen
Rand, an attorney with Consumers
Union, explains that "[i]f a retailer
can't advertise the discount, that
takes away some of the advantage
of discounting. And it also injures
consumers because a lot of con-
sumers shop around by reading
ads." Also, co-op advertising re-
stricts indirect forms of discount-
ing, such as "meet- or-beat" price
guarantees, which often apply only
to published prices. One discount
retailer says he works around the
restrictions by dropping hints in
his ads, such as "call for package
deals," or "financing available."
That retailer explains that "when
customers call, we tell people the
real price in a heartbeat,.... But
getting them to call is the trick."
Many co-op ad agreements are
so restrictive that they even pre-
vent consumer-oriented publica-
tions from getting price informa-
tion. Last year, the Washington
Consumers' Checkbook, a con-
sumers magazine, pulled some
comparative price listings because
retailers were reluctant to share the
information. In a letter to the
editors, one appliance retailer
wrote that "General Electric has
decided that pricing of certain
pieces was not allowed to be pub-
lished in a comparative pricing
format such as your magazine....
Consequently, they are threatening
to suspend our advertising co-op
budget unless the information is
retracted."
Co-op advertising agreements
are not illegal. Federal antitrust
authorities currently differentiate
co-op ad agreements, which specify
"advertised prices," from resale
price maintenance agreements,
which specify "retail prices." Dur-
ing the Carter administration, fed-
eral antitrust authorities consid-
ered co-op ad agreements to be
price-fixing, in violation of the
Sherman Act. Today, it is still
possible to allege an antitrust viola-
tion arising from a co-op ad
scheme, but the complaining party
has to show that the manufacturer
is so dominant that its actions
affect price competition through-
out the market. Kevin Arquit, of
the Federal Trade Commission's
("FTC") Bureau of Competition,
explains that "[t]here has to be a
showing that the anti-competitive
effects outweigh any efficiencies
that the manufacturer wants to
raise." Arquit noted "[w]e have
looked into some allegations of
co-op advertising abuse, but none
yet have resulted in an enforce-
ment action. . . . It would be
speculative to guess whether cur-
rent investigations will result in
actions."
Antitrust attorneys and retailers
say they expect the proliferation of
co-op ad price supports to contin-
ue. In 1990, the FTC dropped its
guidelines, in effect throughout the
70's and 80's, which expressly for-
bid agreements that required the
retailer to advertise certain prices
or refrain from advertising the
price. However, some see a possi-
ble shift in the FTC's attitude
toward antitrust. Recently, the
FTC successfully sought to stop
Nintendo America, Inc. from fix-
ing retail prices. The International
Mass Retailing Association has pe-
titioned the FTC to revise the
consent decree, signed in April,
which says nothing about co-op
advertising. Such an action might
usher in a new era in which federal
antitrust officials once again take a
hard line position against co-op
advertising.
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ANNOUNCEMENT
1992 A.C.C.I.
Conference
The American Council on
Consumer Interests
(A.C.C.I.) will hold its 38th
annual conference March
25-28, in Toronto. For more
information, contact pro-
gram chair Brenda Cude,
University of Illinois, 271 Be-
vier Hall, 905 S. Goodwin,
Urbana, IL 61801
(217-244-2858).
ANNOUNCEMENT
Brochure Available:
Responsibility to Report
Hazardous Consumer
Products
The Coalition for Consum-
er Health and Safety is offer-
ing a free brochure detailing
manufacturers' responsibili-
ties to report hazardous con-
sumer products to the Con-
sumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC). Civil
penalties for failure to report
may run as high as $1.25
million. To receive a free
copy of the brochure, send a
self-addressed stamped enve-
lope to CFA, 1424 16th
Street, N.W., Suite 604,
Washington, DC 20036.
ANNOUNCEMENT
We have acquired the entire
back stock, reprint and
microfilm rights to the
LOYOLA CONSUMER LAW
REPORTER
Current subscriptions
are also available.
Complete Sets and Individual
Volumes are also available for:
WOMEN'S LAW REPORTER
and
LOYOLA QUARTERLY OF PUBLIC
ISSUES AND THE LAW
WILLIAM S. HEIN & CO., INC.
1285 MAIN STREET
BUFFALO, NEW YORK 14209
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